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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY
HEARING IN LOUISIANA
The preliminary hearing' is a pre-trial procedural device de-
signed primarily for determining whether there is probable cause' to
believe the defendant committed the crime for which he was ar-
rested.' Louisiana courts have narrowly interpreted the right of the
accused to a preliminary examination under the 1966 Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure.' Only recently, in Gerstein v. Pugh,5 has the United
States Supreme Court expanded the federal constitutional rights of
all suspects to include a probable cause determination by a neutral
magistrate pending disposition of their cases. Furthermore, the
Louisiana constitution of 1974 provides that the right to a
preliminary examination shall not be denied in felony cases except
where the accused is indicted by a grand jury.' Thus, in some respects
the new Louisiana constitution may go beyond the requirements of
Pugh, while in other areas Pugh enhances the rights of Louisiana
suspects.
Prior Louisiana Legislation and Jurisprudence
Prior to the enactment of the constitution of 1974, several provi-
sions of the Code of Criminal Procedure governed entirely the defen-
dant's right to a preliminary hearing in Louisiana. Under articles 228
and 229, a suspect must be promptly taken to the police station and
1. For brief historical accounts of the birth and evolution of the preliminary hear-
ing, see Anderson, The Preliminary Hearing-Better Alternatives or More of the
Same? 35 Mo. L. REv. 281, 284-85 (1970); Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional
Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section 303 of the Federal
Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1365-78 (1969); Comment, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 1416-17 (1968); Note, 51 IOWA L. REV. 164, 165-67 (1965). See also Bennett,
The 1966 Code of Criminal Procedure, 27 LA. L. REv. 175, 185-87 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Bennett].
2. Probable cause is a nebulous term susceptible of various formulations. There
is substantial agreement that probable cause is less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, but there is disagreement as to how much less. See Note, 48 So. CAL. L. REV.
158, 161 n.19 (1974). The United States Supreme Court has given the following defini-
tion: "[facts] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had
committed or was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
3. See Bennett at 185.
4. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 291-98 deal with the preliminary hearing.
5. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971), enforced, 336 F. Supp.
490 (S.D. Fla. 1972), 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. granted sub nom., Gerstein v. Pugh, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975).
6. LA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
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informed of his right to request a preliminary hearing. Similarly,
under article 230.1 the suspect must be brought before a judge within
six days for the appointment of counsel, at which time he presumably
will again be informed of his right to request an examination.7 Article
292 required that the court immediately order a preliminary exami-
nation in felony cases upon the motion of the state or defendant if
there were no grand jury indictment or if no information were filed
by the district attorney; if there had been an indictment or an infor-
mation, the granting of the hearing became discretionary.' Article 296
provides that if the defendant has been charged by an information,
the court may still determine probable cause, but if an indictment
has been filed, the preliminary hearing is limited to the perpetuation
of testimony and the fixing of bail.
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution must produce evi-
dence9 and the defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel,'0
compulsory attendance of witnesses, confrontation and cross exami-
nation." Thus, although the primary purpose served by the prelimi-
nary examination is to insure that there is probable cause to believe
an offense has been committed, in practice, the hearing may provide
a most valuable discovery device to Louisiana suspects seeking to
widen their limited access to criminal discovery.'" Yet, the lower
courts and the Louisiana supreme court have failed to recognize the
full potential of the device,'3 despite the discretion afforded judges
under articles 292 and 296 in determining whether to grant the hear-
ing after indictment or information.'4 Indeed, when it has appeared
7. However, LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 230.1(D) provides that "[tihe failure of the
sheriff to comply with the requirements herein shall have no effect whatsoever upon
the validity of the proceedings thereafter against the defendant."
8. Article 292 was amended in 1974 to conform to the new constitution. Under the
amended article, the right to a preliminary hearing is no longer cut off by the filing of
an information by the district attorney. See text at notes 75-76 infra.
9. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 296 & comment (a).
10. Id. art. 293; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
11. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 294. See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
12. See U.S. ex rel. Wheeler v. Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); see
also Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944
(1965). For illustrations of Louisiana's relatively narrow discovery, see State v. Lee,
264 La. 36, 270 So. 2d 544 (1972); State v. Migliore, 261 La. 722, 260 So. 2d 682 (1972).
See also The Work of the Louisiana App'ellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Criminal Procedure I, 34 LA. L. REV. 396, 423-26 (1974).
13. The Louisiana supreme court has described the role of the preliminary hearing
as "designed primarily to determine whether probable cause exists to charge the ac-
cused." State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 1008, 221 So. 2d 484, 489 (La. 1969), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 949 (1971). See also LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 296, comment (a).
14. Prior jurisprudence, relying heavily upon the discretion of the trial judge,
[Vol. 35
COMMENTS
that discovery is the main purpose of the defendant's request, the
hearing has been denied. 5 Such a limited view of the preliminary
hearing ignores the modern concept of the proceeding as a device used
almost exclusively for discovery purposes by defense counsel."
The court's unsolicitous attitude toward preliminary hearings is
reflected throughout the jurisprudence." Two cases, State v.
Raymond"5 and State v. Hudson,9 narrowed the already limited sta-
tutory right to a preliminary examination when there is grand jury
intervention. In Raymond, the Louisiana supreme court refused to
grant relief to a defendant who was denied a preliminary examina-
tion, although the hearing had been requested and ordered before the
return of a grand jury indictment and the defendant's request had
been held in abeyance for almost a month.20 As Justice Barham
argued in dissent from the denial of writs, the court's action effec-
tively writes out of the Code the article 292 requirement of an imme-
diate preliminary examination by conditioning the defendant's right
to a preliminary examination upon a prosecutorial decision not to
place the matter before the grand jury.2' One commentator has criti-
cized Raymond on the additional ground that it limits the function
of the preliminary examination to that of an alternative method of
determining probable cause to hold the accused to answer for a crime,
rather than allowing it to perform a valuable role as a discovery
device.12
rarely reversed a district court's refusal to order a preliminary hearing. Furthermore,
the correctness of the ruling becomes moot once the verdict is signed unless the defen-
dant can show a denial of rights resulting in some specific prejudice which made a fair
trial impossible. To avert this dilemma, defendants have sought supervisory writs at
the time of the denial. See generally State v. McCoy, 258 La. 645, 247 So. 2d 562 (1971).
15. See, e.g., State v. Raymond, 254 La. 911, 228 So. 2d 312 (1969) (denial of
writs); State v. Manuel, 253 La. 195, 217 So. 2d 369 (1968).
16. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Criminal Procedure, 31 LA. L. REV. 365 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan].
17. See, e.g., State ex rel. Harvey v. Boudoin, 292 So. 2d 245 (La. 1974); State v.
Doyle, 290 So. 2d 903 (La. 1974); State v. Eames, 260 La. 692, 257 So. 2d 152 (1972);
State v. Pesson, 256 La. 201, 235 So. 2d 568 (1970); State v. Raymond, 254 La. 911,
228 So. 2d 312 (1969), criticized in Sullivan, supra note 16, at 365-66; State v. Hudson,
253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 949 (1971), noted in The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-Criminal Procedure, 30 LA.
L. REV. 309, 310 (1970).
18. 254 La. 911, 228 So. 2d 312 (1969) (denial of writs).
19. 253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969).
20. 254 La. 911, 228 So. 2d 312 (1969) (Barham, J., dissenting from denial of
writs). A more recent case to the same effect is State v. Monroe, 299 So. 2d 795 (La.
1974) (Barham, J., dissenting from denial of writs).
21. State v. Raymond, 254 La. 911, 228 So. 2d 312 (1969) (Barham, J., dissenting
from denial of writs).
22. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 365-66.
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Although Hudson does not go as far as Raymond, it too repre-
sents a significant step in the "watering down""3 of the code articles.
When brought before the committing magistrate on May 22, 1967, the
defendant requested and was granted a preliminary hearing which
was ordered for June 2. Because the charge was pending before the
grand jury on June 2, the hearing was continued until June 8.11 A true
bill was returned on June 7 and defendant received his preliminary
examination, limited to bail, on June 30.11 Reasoning that the brief
continuance was not prejudicial to the defendant, the Louisiana su-
preme court found that the deferral to the grand jury did not violate
the spirit of article 292, as both the grand jury and the preliminary
hearing serve the function of determining probable cause." The court
further noted that the code did not require the prosecutor to present
the same case in different forums at the same time."
The jurisprudence has likewise accorded scant protection to the
defendant's right to a preliminary hearing when interpreting the
codal provisions governing the availability of preliminary examina-
tion after an information is filed. Article 292, which committed to the
discretion of the trial court the decision whether to grant a prelimi-
nary hearing once a bill of information has been filed by the district
attorney, " was apparently intended to apply only when the defen-
dant's request for a preliminary hearing came after an information
was filed." However, several cases further narrowed the defendant's
right to an examination by holding that an information filed even
after a preliminary examination has been ordered defeats the right
to such an examination as does a grand jury indictment." Although
these holdings were seemingly overruled in State v. Jackson,3' they
23. This phrase was used by Justice Barham concurring in the granting of writs
in State v. Jackson, 282 So. 2d 526, 527 (La. 1973), to refer to many of the court's recent
holdings. See, e.g., State v. Pesson, 256 La. 201, 235 So. 2d 568 (1970).
24. State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 1007, 221 So. 2d 484, 489 (1969).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1009, 221 So. 2d at 490.
27. Id. at 1010, 228 So. 2d at 490. But see note 31 infra.
28. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 292, as amended by La. Acts 1974, Ex. Sess., No. 16,
no longer gives the courts discretion to refuse to grant a preliminary hearing after a
bill of information has been filed in a felony case. See text at notes 75-76 infra.
29. Before the 1974 amendment, article 292 provided in part: "After the finding
of an indictment or the filing of an information an order for a preliminary examination
in felony cases may be granted by the court .... (Emphasis added.) See also Har-
grave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REv.
1, 49 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hargrave].
30. E.g., State v. McCoy, 258 La. 645, 247 So. 2d 562 (1971); State v. Pesson, 256
La. 201, 235 So. 2d 568 (1970).
31. 282 So. 2d 526 (La. 1973). In Jackson, the supreme court ordered the trial
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were recently partially exhumed in State v. Marshall,"2 where the
defendant withdrew his first request for a preliminary hearing be-
cause a bill of information had been filed against him.3 3 His later
request for a hearing was refused and writs denied even though the
defendant had been in prison for eight months. 4
Gerstein v. Pugh
Gerstein v. Pugh3 involved a challenge to a Florida information
procedure, very similar to Louisiana's, by which an individual could
be arrested and detained with no judicial determination of probable
cause until arraignment, often as long as thirty days after arrest .3
The plaintiffs, who filed a class action in federal district court on
behalf of themselves and all others detained solely upon direct infor-
mations filed by the district attorney, sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief to require that they be afforded adversarial preliminary
examinations. The district court held that under the fourth and four-
teenth amendments the class was so entitled37 and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 8 The United States Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to probable cause deter-
minations by a neutral magistrate, but not to preliminary examina-
tions. 31
The Supreme Court noted that the standards and procedures for
arrest and detention had been derived from the fourth amendment
and its common law antecedents 0 and that prior cases had unequivo-
cally established that the criteria for a lawful arrest, i.e., probable
cause, must be determined by a neutral magistrate whenever possi-
judge to hold a preliminary examination after an indictment was returned. The hearing
had been requested and ordered before the return of the indictment. Justice Barham,
concurring, explained the court's decision as requiring that once a preliminary exami-
nation is ordered it must be held even though an indictment or information is filed in
the interim. Id. (concurring in the granting of writs).
32. 284 So. 2d 778 (La. 1973) (denial of writs). See also State v. Monroe, 299 So.
2d 795 (La. 1974) (writs denied although facts were indistinguishable from State v.
Jackson); State v. Renard, 296 So. 2d 833 (La. 1974).
33. 284 So. 2d at 778.
34. Id.
35. 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975).
36. Id. at 859. See also State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972).
37. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971), noted in 25 VAND. L.
REV. 434 (1972).
38. 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. 95 S. Ct. 854, 869 (1975).
40. Id. at 861-62 citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973), Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
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ble.1" Although summary action by the state may be justified prior
to arrest because the accused has a greater opportunity to escape
apprehension during the time required to conduct a probable cause
determination, this prime concern quickly evaporates after arrest and
the suspect's need for a probable cause hearing increases signifi-
cantly.2
Thus, the Court concluded that all arrestees, whether suspected
felons or misdemeanants, have a constitutional right to a probable
cause determination by a neutral magistrate.4 3 Furthermore, though
released pending trial, a defendant may find significant restraints on
his liberty which affect his job, income, and family relationships.44
Hence, the Court declared that the right to a neutral determination
after arrest also applies to all suspects released on bail. 5
Although Pugh established that a neutral determination is con-
stitutionally compelled, it found that the adversarial safeguards of a
preliminary examination are not, deeming them unnecessary, to a
reliable determination of probable cause. 6 Traditionally, the court
41. 95 S. Ct. at 862. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
42. 95 S. Ct. at 863.
43. Id. The Court apparently accepted the lower courts' holdings that there was
no basis for distinguishing felons and misdemeanants. Cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel) noted in 33 LA. L. REv. 731 (1973), 47 TuL. L. Rv.
446 (1973).
44. The Court explained, "Even pretrial release may be accompanied by burden-
some conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty. When the stakes are this
high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential. 95 S. Ct. at
863.
45. An argument could be made, however, that the restraints which require the
holding of the probable cause determination when a suspect is released on bond are of
the same nature as those enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2), (5) (1966). See 95 S.
Ct. at 863. The federal statute places restrictions on travel, association, place of abode
and allows the judge to impose any other condition deemed necessary to assure appear-
ance, including that the person return to custody after specified hours of release. The
only condition imposed by Louisiana is the article 330 requirement that the defendant
shall not leave the state without written permission of the court. If Pugh is interpreted
to require the type of restraint listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2), (5) before the hearing
is considered mandatory, it is arguable that article 330 imposes such a limitation
because it is a restraint on travel. The better view, however, would be to consider
restraints on liberty and employment significant enough to require the hearing.
46. 95 S. Ct. at 866. The Court distinguished Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), which held that a parolee has a
right to a preliminary hearing at the place of arrest prior to revocation of his probation
and return to prison. The Court reasoned that in addition to the usual function per-
formed by the preliminary hearing, the hearing mandated in Morrissey served to
gather and preserve live testimony which could be used at the final revocation hearing,
often held some distance away from the place of arrest. Moreover, revocation proceed-
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has approved more informal modes for determining probable cause,
including ex parte proceedings. 7 For example, the fourth amendment
requisites for issuance of a search or arrest warrant are satisfied when
a police officer presents facts to a magistrate which evidence probable
cause. Although confrontation and cross-examination might "en-
hance" the reliability of these determinations, "their value would be
too slight to justify holding, as a matter of constitutional principle,
that these formalities and safeguards . . . must be employed."" Nor
is there a constitutional right to counsel at the probable cause deter-
mination as it is not a critical stage of the prosecution. 9 Furthermore,
the deprivation of a probable cause hearing will not be grounds for a
reversal of a subsequent guilty verdict." Thus, if an independent
determination of probable cause for arrest is made prior to the appre-
hension of the suspect, the requirements of Pugh are satisfied and
there is no need for a subsequent determination following arrest.5'
The result in the Pugh case, although sustainable upon a pure
ings may offer less protection from initial error than more formal criminal process
whereby violations are specifically defined by statute. 95 S. Ct. at 867. But see Com-
ment, 48 So. CAL. L. REv. 158, 177-78 (1974).
For cases holding there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing at any
time, see Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26, 32 (10th Cir. 1973); Barber v. Arkan-
sas, 429 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1970); Walker v. Rodgers, 389 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906
(1968); Dillard v. Bomar, 342 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965);
Odell v. Burke, 281 F.2d 782, 786 (7th Cir. 1960). Cf. Kerr v. Dutton, 393 F.2d 79 (5th
Cir. 1968). For similar language in Louisiana, see State v. Manuel, 253 La. 195, 217
So. 2d 369 (1969); State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 24, 215 So. 2d 838, 839 (1968).
47. 95 S. Ct. at 866. Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
48. 95 S. Ct. at 867.
49. Id. The Court distinguished Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), which
held that the Alabama preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" in the prosecution
requiring assistance of counsel. The function of the hearing in Coleman was to deter-
mine whether to charge the suspect with an offense and the Court reasoned that an
accused's defense on the merits would be compromised if counsel were not available
to cross-examine the state's witnesses. In the Pugh procedure, however, the fourth
amendment probable cause determination is addressed solely to pretrial custody and
there are no witnesses to cross-examine. 95 S. Ct. at 867-68.
50. 95 S. Ct. at 865. Even if there is a finding of no probable cause after the
hearing, there can nevertheless be a subsequent prosecution by information. Id. Cf.
Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913). See also note 14 supra.
51. 95 S. Ct. at 868-69. The Court noted that a grand jury indictment conclusively
determines the issue of probable cause and hence satisfies the fourth amendment. Id.
at 865 n.19. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the grand jury procedure is no more
neutral than the information, since the grand jury is a lay body whose guidance comes




fourth amendment analysis, ignores important due process rights of
the defendant apart from the safeguards surrounding the arrest pro-
cedure. It is true that the Pugh neutral determination should suffice
to justify initial arrest and detention; however, the Court failed to
recognize the due process implications arising from the continuing
restraints incarceration or even release on bond places on presump-
tively innocent suspects. The deprivation of liberty thereby occa-
sioned should trigger a due process inquiry and, as the four concur-
ring Justices52 noted, it indeed seems anomalous to hold that one
deprived of his liberty is entitled to fewer safeguards than those de-
prived of their property. However, after the Pugh decision, this dis-
parity of protection can be seen in many instances.53 The language of
Goldberg v. Kelly,5 which required an adversary hearing prior to
termination of welfare benefits is particularly appropriate: "The ex-
tent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient
is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer
grievous loss' .. ."I
Clearly a criminal suspect suffers a deprivation that is at least
as grievous as that sustained by plaintiff in the Goldberg case. Fun-
damental fairness would seem to dictate that a citizen who has been
deprived of this liberty have an opportunity to confront his accusers
or the police in a judicial setting as soon as possible after arrest."
52. Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan and Marshall concurred in that part of
the opinion which held that the Constitution clearly requires at least a judicial deter-
mination of probable cause, but felt that the rest of the opinion was dicta in that it
specified what the Constitution did not require. Justice Powell believed that the issues
were before the Court because Florida had prescribed what was required. 95 S. Ct. at
869 n.27.
53. See generally Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975) (temporary suspension of
public school student); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem., Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719
(1975) (garnishing a commercial bank account); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(custody hearings for unwed fathers); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's
license); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (prior hearing before notice
could be posted preventing appellee from buying liquor); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(garnishment of wages). See generally Anderson & L'Enfant, Fuentes v.
Shevin-Procedural Due Process and Louisiana's Creditor's Remedies, 33 LA. L. REV.
62 (1972); Note, 35 LA. L. REV. 221 (1974). Justice Powell believed that no analogy
could be drawn from the above cases because the historical basis of the probable cause
requirement is different from the recent application of the due process clause in debtor-
creditor disputes. 95 S. Ct. at 869 n.27.
54. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
55. Id. at 262-63.
56. See remarks of Dean Kenneth A. Pye in the Hearings on the U.S. Commis-
sioner System Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
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Such fairness would also seem to require that the accused be given
the opportunity to have counsel present at the hearing, to confront
the state's witnesses and cross-examine them, and to compel the
attendance of his own witnesses; the accused would thereby be able
to test the soundness of the case against him and to better prepare
his defense. At the same time, such a procedure would have the effect
of dissuading the overzealous prosecutor from going forward with a
weak case.57
The Louisiana Constitution of 1974
During the drafting of article I, § 14 of the new Louisiana consti-
tution, the convention was aware of the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Pugh58 which held that there was a constitutional right to a prelimi-
nary hearing in all cases prior to the return of an indictment. While
the convention rejected extending the right to all cases,59 the constitu-
tion of 1974 does provide Louisiana felony suspects the right to a
preliminary examination absent an indictment by a grand jury."0
Thus, after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pugh, the
Louisiana arrestee suspected of committing a felony is assured a more
comprehensive hearing under the state constitution than under the
Federal Constitution. However, in two areas, Pugh is a vehicle for
expanding the rights of Louisiana suspects. Because there is no state
constitutional right to a preliminary hearing in non-felony cases, the
legislature could presumably provide for the detention of suspects
solely upon the basis of an information had Pugh not foreclosed this
possibility by providing for at least a probable cause determination
for all misdemeanants, a class not protected by the state constitution.
Pugh also affords all suspects released on bail at least a probable
cause determination."
It may be unnecessary, however, for the suspected felon released
on bail to resort to Pugh and its minimal procedural protection be-
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 266, 270-71 (1966), reprinted in
L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 846-47 (3d
ed. 1969).
57. See generally Note, 25 VAND. L. REV. 434, 444 (1972).
58. 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973), noted in Comment, 48 So. CAL. L. REV. 158
(1974); Note, 60 VA. L. REV. 540 (1974). For a discussion of the district court's decision
see Note, 25 VAND. L. REv. 434 (1972).
59. Hargrave at 48-49 nn.256-57.
60. LA. CONST. art. I, § 14. For a discussion of Louisiana's new Declaration of
Rights see Hargrave, supra note 29; Miller, The Declaration of Rights: Criminal
Provisions, 21 LOYOLA L. REV. 43 (1975).
61. See text at notes 44-45 supra.
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cause the broad language"2 of article I, § 14 could entitle him to a full
preliminary hearing if the Louisiana courts draw an analogy to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Klopfer v. North Carolina."
In Klopfer, the Court invalidated a state statute whereby the district
attorney could obtain a nolle prosequi with leave allowing him to
suspend the proceedings against the accused indefinitely without
showing any justification. 4 The proceedings were not terminated be-
cause the prosecutor could have the case restored to the docket at
will. Although the procedure allowed the defendant to go "wither-
soever he will[ed]"5 until the case was so restored, the Court rea-
soned that the right to a speedy trial afforded affirmative protection
to the accused because there were still severe limitations on his lib-
erty: the pendency of the indictment could subject him to public
scorn, deprive him of employment and severely disrupt his social
life.6"
The Klopfer rationale could be.applied to an accused free on bail
awaiting a judicial determination of probable cause. The fact that he
is "free" does not lessen the likelihood of public scorn or social disrup-
tion; thus, the state constitutional provision should be interpreted to
allow the defendant access to all of the safeguards provided by pre-
liminary examinations to determine probable cause as soon as possi-
ble after arrest. Providing an examination under these circumstances
would be a significant step toward guaranteeing the accused his con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial as well as providing a check on
prosecutorial discretion to go forward with the proceedings.
For the most part, the purpose and scope of the examination
under the new state constitution continues to be the traditional one
of judicial intervention to determine whether probable cause exists
to hold an individual, instead of leaving that decision solely to law
enforcement agencies. The convention also viewed the preliminary
hearing as a valuable tool in checking the discretion of local law
enforcement agencies in the area of pre-trial procedure," particularly
62. LA. CONST. art. I, § 14 provides: "The right to a preliminary examination shall
not be denied in felony cases except where the accused is indicted by a grand jury."
63. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
64. Id. at 214.
65. Id. at 222.
66. Id. at 222-23.
67. Id. at 223. The state also has a strong interest in holding a speedy preliminary
examination, i.e., to insure that its citizens are not arbitrarily deprived of liberty and
needlessly subjected to humiliation and expense of a public prosecution. See Com-
ment, 48 So. CAL. L. REV. 152, 182-83 (1974).




since the general supervisory powers of the attorney general over the
district attorneys are not as broad under the new constitution as
compared to the 1921 constitution. 0
While the delegates manifested no intention to exliand the dis-
covery function of the preliminary examination, they did envision
adversary proceedings between state and defense," and thus, the
articles of the 1966 Code providing therefor72 should be retained. Fur-
thermore, article 296 which provides that a preliminary hearing after
the return of an indictment is discretionary, 3 and, if held, is limited
to the perpetuation of testimony and the fixing of bail, should also
be retained as it conforms to the new constitution and may foster use
of the preliminary hearing for discovery purposes.
It is clear that the state has the burden of furnishing the defen-
dant a preliminary examination if he requests it because section 14
mandates that "the right shall not be denied. . . ." However, it does
not seem to put any responsibility on the state to hold an examina-
tion absent a request by the defendant. Thus, if the defendant does
not request the examination before trial, or even if he is improperly
denied a hearing upon request, a subsequent guilty verdict would
probably moot the issue." Nevertheless, the decreased judicial and
prosecutorial discretion under the new constitution in the granting of
a preliminary hearing should improve defendant's chances of success
in challenging an incorrect ruling through the use of the supervisory
writs at the time of the denial.
Article 292 of the Code has been amended" to conform to the new
constitutional provision and reverses the notion that the preliminary
hearing is discretionary once a bill of information is filed by the
70. Compare LA. CONST. art. IV, § 7 with La. Const. art. VII, § 56 (1921); Hargrave
at 51 n.272.
71. Hargrave at 49 n.263, 50 n.265.
72. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 293-97.
73. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 292 as amended by La. Acts 1974, Ex. Sess. No.
161 providing in pertinent part: "An order for a preliminary examination in felony
cases may be granted by the court at any time ... before or after defendant has been
indicted by a grand jury."
74. See note 14 supra.
75. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 292, as amended by La. Acts 1974, Ex. Sess. No. 161:
"The court, on request of the state or the defendant, shall immediately order a
preliminary examination in felony cases unless the defendant has been indicted by
a grand jury.
"After the defendant has been indicted by a grand jury, the court may rescind its
order for a preliminary examination.
"An order for a preliminary examination in felony cases may be granted by the
court at any time, either on its own motion or on request of the state or of the defendant
before or after the defendant has been indicted by a grand jury."
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district attorney. The new constitution and codal provision firmly
overrule the line of cases"5 which denied the statutory right to a pre-
liminary hearing after an information was filed, although it had been
ordered before filing. Thus, there is an absolute right to an immediate
preliminary hearing in all felony cases except when an indictment has
been returned by the grand jury.
Furthermore, the Hudson and Raymond cases are no longer con-
trolling since the right to a preliminary hearing exists, "except when
the accused is indicted by the grand jury." The fact that the grand
jury is investigating the matter or is scheduled to do so should neither
defeat the right nor influence the timing of the hearing." In all cases
in which the right is guaranteed, the examination should be held
promptly after arrest to avoid prolonged incarceration without a judi-
cial determination of probable cause in accordance with amended
article 292 and the spirit of the 1974 constitution.7 The explicit lan-
guage of the new constitution should overcome any reticence the
supreme court may have in affording suspects their right to a prelimi-
nary examination.7
Robert C. Lowe
76. E.g., State v. McCoy, 258 La. 645, 247 So. 2d 562 (1971); State v. Pesson, 256
La. 201, 235 So. 2d 568 (1970).
77. See Hargrave at 49. In light of the explicit language of LA. CONST. art. I, § 14,
the second paragraph of amended article 292 should not be interpreted to reinstate the
Hudson-Raymond holdings.
78. See Hargrave at 49 n.264.
79. But see State v. Perkins, No. 55,941 (La. S. Ct. March, 1975) in which the
court denied writs, although the "preliminary examination" consisted of the testimony
of one state's witness who, over defendant's objection, was allowed to relate hearsay
and double hearsay in establishing probable cause. Noting that the Code does not
provide for the type of hearing sanctioned by the majority, Justice Barham concluded
that, "If the view expressed by the majority prevails, they have eviscerated one com-
plete title from the Code of Criminal Procedure. . . . It is a usurpation of the legisla-
tive power and disregard of the people's new expression through the Constitution. . ..
It is our obligation to apply that Constitution in every case where it does not conflict
with or limit the rights and privileges guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
tion. . . . I am therefore hopeful that when this issue is presented again, this court
. . . will follow the clear expression of law by statute and constitution." Id.
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